

# Designing secure multiple-server authentication schemes

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# Significant technologies

- **Internet of Things (IoT)**  
2018 \$772 billions are spent on IoT devices
- **Edge computing**  
Edge computing broadly as all computing outside the cloud happening at the edge of the network, and more specifically in applications where realtime processing of data is required.
- **Cloud computing**  
Several advantages (cost savings, scalability, robustness, etc.)
- **Smart home, city**  
Savings, safety, convenience, and control.



# Security challenges

## Fears of internal and external attackers

- Data is available to service providers -clouds
- "Optimizing" production at the expense of security - IoT  
Resource constrained devices
- Human risks
  - Poor security  
Most devices use weak or default passwords.
  - Poor maintenance  
After the initial setup, users do not use the devices properly (update).
- These systems and devices are common targets of cyber attackers.
  - Different types of external attacks
  - Zombie networks, DoS attacks, MITM, Brute Force, etc.
  - Several incidents: Mirai and other Botnets (dictionary attack)

# Definitions

- Entity authentication

The protocol by which one entity is assured of the identity of a second entity.

Folláth J, Huszti A, Pethő A, " **DESIGN In Asymmetric Authentication System**", ICAI 2007 Eger, Magyarország, pp. 53-61. , 9 p.

- Cryptographic protocol

It is a system of rules that allow two or more entities of a communications system to transmit information via any kind of variation of a physical quantity and accomplish one or more security goals.

- Mutual authentication

In mutual authentication parties who engage in a conversation in which each gains confidence that it is the other with whom he speaks.

- Key agreement

Both entities contribute to the joint secret key by providing information from which the key is derived.

- Authenticated key agreement protocol

A key exchange protocol that provides mutual implicit key authentication is called an authenticated key agreement protocol (AK protocol).

# Concept of Distributed Authentication

## Centralized structure

- There are fears about the centralized structure
- Central databases are primary targets for hackers
- If these databases are compromised it cause huge damage.
- A single point of failure occurs typically in single-server solutions.

If the server is unavailable, the provider usually needs to ensure replication to tackle the failure of their servers.

- Golden Ticket Attack, OneLogin attack

## Distributed Authentication

- External attackers have to attack multiple servers simultaneously, which increases the attack cost.
- If one or more servers break down or become corrupt, the service provider is able to service and authenticate the users securely.

# Security goals designing authenticated key agreement protocol


- **Correctness:** Participants will always accept the same symmetric key.
- **Key secrecy:** In the presence of an active attacker, the symmetric key can be calculated only by the participants.
- **Known-key security (Freshness):** Each protocol run results in a unique secret symmetric key. A compromised symmetric key is not able to provide information about other symmetric keys.
- **Mutual authentication:** Mutual authentication prevents an attacker from impersonating a legitimate participant and illegally accessing user information.
- **(Perfect) Forward-secrecy:** It holds if long-term secrets of one or more entities are compromised and **the secrecy of previous session keys is not affected.**

# One-Time Password Authentication and Key Exchange for Cloud Environment

- Two-factor authentication  
static password + one-time password
- Malicious insiders  
distributed authentication among cloud servers, one-time password is stored distributed
- MAC key exchange  
providing data origin integrity
- Improving efficiency



# Merkle-tree





# One-Time Password Authentication and Key Exchange for Cloud Environment

Andrea Huszti and Norbert Oláh. "**A simple authentication scheme for clouds.**" 2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS). IEEE, 2016.

Andrea Huszti and Norbert Oláh. "**DECAP-Distributed Extensible Cloud Authentication Protocol**" 2nd CRYPTACUS Workshop 16-18 November 2017 Radboud University, Nijmegen The Netherlands (<https://cryptacus.cs.ru.nl>). 2017.

Andrea Huszti and Norbert Oláh. "**Security analysis of a cloud authentication protocol using applied pi calculus.**" International Journal of Internet Protocol Technology 12.1 (2019): 16-25.

# Identity-based cryptography

- Certificate-based:




Fig. 1.9 Certifying authority and trust in public key.

- Identity-based:




Fig. 1.10 An overview of an IBE scheme.



# Bilinear map

## Definition

Let  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  be two groups of order  $q$  for some large prime  $q$ . A map  $e : G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$  is an admissible bilinear map if satisfies the following properties:

- 1 Bilinear: We say that a map  $e : G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$  is bilinear if  $e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)^{ab}$  for all  $P, Q \in G_1$  and all  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ .
- 2 Non-degenerate: The map does not send all pairs in  $G_1 \times G_1$  to the identity in  $G_2$ . Since  $G_1, G_2$  are groups of prime order, if  $P$  is a generator of  $G_1$  then  $e(P, P)$  is a generator of  $G_2$ .
- 3 Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute  $e(P, Q)$  for any  $P, Q \in G_1$ .

# Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem

## Definition

Let  $e : G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$  be a bilinear map on  $(G_1, G_2)$  and  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . Given  $(P, aP, bP, cP)$ , compute  $e(P, P)^{abc}$ .

# Identity-based cryptography

- Gábor Kovács and Attila Pethő. "**Személyre szabott titkosítási rendszerek megvalósítása**" (2014)
- Lilla Nyakacska and Andrea, Huszti. "**Elliptikus görbék és bilineáris párosítások**" (2016)
- Andrea, Huszti and Norbert Oláh. "**Identity-Based Cloud Authentication Protocol.**" THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF PHD STUDENTS IN COMPUTER SCIENCE. 2018.
- Ádám, Vécsi, Attila Bagossy, and Attila Pethő. "**Cross-platform Identity-based Cryptography using WebAssembly.**" Infocommunications (2019): 31. - (SETIT project)
- Szilárd Dávid Szürti and Botond Mezei "**Attribute-based Encryption WASI-alapú platformfüggetlen implementációja**" - TDK (2020) (SETIT project)  
Supervisors: Attila Bagossy and Ádám Vécsi

# Provably Secure Scalable Distributed Authentication for Clouds

- Shared secret key between two or more entities
- Take advantages of the distributed system — distributed authentication
  - Robustness, scalability and greater availability
- Authenticated key exchange:
  - Password-based
  - Key agreement and key confirmation between the parties
  - Provably secure protocol
  - Efficiency

# Theorem

## Theorem

*The proposed protocol is a secure AKC protocol in the random oracle model, assuming MAC is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack and symmetric encryption scheme is indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack, moreover ECCDH assumption holds in the elliptic curve group.*

*Proof* Consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  and suppose that

$$\Pr[\text{No-Matching}^{\mathcal{A}}(\kappa)]$$

is non-negligible. There are two cases: either the edge or the client oracle is accepted.



## Security assumption of the symmetric encryption

- $n_C(\kappa)$  indicates the probability of an event that the attacker is successful
- Suppose that a client oracle is accepted — a server oracle is impersonated by the attacker
- Generating an  $\mathcal{F}$  polynomial-time algorithm to break the symmetric encryption scheme is *indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack*

$$\xi_2(\kappa) = \frac{n_C(\kappa)}{T_1(\kappa) T_2(\kappa) \binom{T_2(\kappa)-1}{k-1} T_3(\kappa)} - \lambda(\kappa),$$

- It contradicts the security assumption of the symmetric encryption

# Provably Secure Scalable Distributed Authentication for Clouds

Andrea Huszti and Norbert Oláh. **Provably Secure Authenticated Key Agreement with Key Confirmation for Distributed Systems**, (2019), Proceedings of 14th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST-2019), pp:69-75.

Andrea Huszti and Norbert Oláh. (2020) **Provably Secure Scalable Distributed Authentication for Clouds**. In: Krenn S., Shulman H., Vaudenay S. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 12579. Springer, Cham. pp 188-210  
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65411-5\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65411-5_10)



AZ NKFI ALAPBÓL  
MEGVALÓSULÓ PROJEKT

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Thank you for your attention!

# Identity-based encryption

IBE: ( $Setup$ ,  $Key$ ,  $Enc$ ,  $Dec$ )

- $Setup$

output:  $(PP, msk)$ ,

$PP = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{I}, mpk)$  public parameters and  $msk$  a master secret key

- $Key$

input:  $id \in \mathcal{I}$  public key,  $PP$ ,  $msk$

output:  $d_{id}$  secret key

- $Enc$

input:  $id \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $m \in \mathcal{P}$ ,  $PP$

output:  $c \in \mathcal{C}$

- $Dec$

input:  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ ,  $id \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $d_{id}$ ,  $PP$

output:  $m \in \mathcal{P}$